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Abstract
In the aftermath of the 2007 global financial crisis, regula-
tors have agreed a substantial tightening of prudential regu-
lation for banks operating in the traditional banking sector
(TBS). The TBS is stringently regulated under the Basel
Accords to moderate financial stability and to minimise risk
to government and taxpayers. While prudential regulation is
important from a financial stability perspective, the flipside is
that the Basel Accords only apply to the TBS, they do not
regulate the shadow banking sector (SBS). While it is not
disputed that the SBS provides numerous benefits given the
net credit growth of the economy since the global financial
crisis has come from the SBS rather than traditional banking
channels, the SBS also poses many risks. Therefore, the fact
that the SBS is not subject to prudential regulation is a cause
of serious systemic concern. The introduction of Basel IV,
which compliments Basel III, seeks to complete the Basel
framework on prudential banking regulation. On the
example of this set of standards and its potential negative
consequences for the TBS, this paper aims to visualise the
incentives for TBS institutions to move some of their activi-
ties into the SBS, and thus stress the need for more compre-
hensive regulation of the SBS. Current coronavirus crisis
forced Basel Committee to postpone implementation of the
Basel IV rules – this could be perceived as a chance to com-
plete the financial regulatory framework and address the
SBS as well.
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1 Introduction
The autopsy of the 2007 global financial crisis has been
a watershed moment for the way in which the financial
sector functions.1 One of the most significant changes
relates to the functioning of the banking sector. The tra-
ditional banking sector (TBS), which is subject to strin-
gent prudential supervision under acts implementing
the Basel Accords, consists of credit institutions grant-
ing loans and accepting deposits.2 However, this is not
the only form of banking; there also exists another bank-
ing sector – shadow banking.3 The shadow banking sec-
tor (SBS), now dubbed ‘the future of global finance’,
consists of a complicated web of entities, activities and
transactions that, arguably, only ‘Wall Street wizards’
truly understand.4 There are numerous reasons why the
SBS has risen to prominence; namely, through the evo-
lution of prudential banking standards, the negative
impact on profitability, the exploitation of regulatory
arbitrage and new innovative financial products – which
have all been key facilitators of the shift towards the
SBS.5
The aim of this study is to explore the significance of
the most recent set of changes to the Basel III frame-
1. For an extensive analysis of reasons and (ongoing) consequences of
global financial crisis see A. Tooze, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial
Crises Changed the World (Viking 2018); A.S. Blinder, After the Music
Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the Response, and the Work Ahead (Pen-
guin Press 2013); National Commission on the Causes of the Financial
and Economic Crisis in the United States, ‘The Financial Crisis Inquiry
Report’ (2011), www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-
FCIC.pdf (last visited 2 January 2019).
2. Art. 4(1)(1), Regulation 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit insti-
tutions and investment firms and amending regulation (EU) No
648/2012 [2013] OJ L 176/1 known as Capital Requirements Regula-
tion (CRR 575/2013).
3. Some commentators have argued that the TBS is now a ‘back office
activity’. See J. Cullen, ‘The Repo Market, Collateral and Systemic Risk:
In Search of Regulatory Coherence’ in I.H.-Y. Chiu and I.G. MacNeil
(eds.), Research Handbook on Shadow Banking Legal and Regulatory
Aspects (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018) 85-92.
4. P. Mehrling, Z. Pozsar, J. Sweeney & D.H. Neilson, ‘Bagehot was a
Shadow Banker: Shadow Banking, Central Banking, and the Future of
Global Finance’, Institute for New Economic Thinking, Discussion Paper
2013. See also, B. Gross, ‘Beware Our Shadow Banking System’, CNN
Money (28 November 2007), http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/27/
news/newsmakers/gross_banking.fortune/ (last visited 28 December
2018).
5. Other issues that have contributed to the rise of shadow banking
include regulatory changes, diversification, an increased demand for
adaptable and novel financial products offering above market yields in
low interest rate environments and specialisations. This article focuses
on regulatory arbitrage.
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work – the so-called Basel IV6 – both in relation to the
rise of the SBS and in the context of current corona-
virus-related developments. In doing so, we intend to
demonstrate that ever more stringent regulation and
supervision of the TBS without creating an analogous
framework for the SBS is not going to make the finan-
cial system more stable. Our contribution will be struc-
tured as follows: Section 2 will explain the shadow
banking phenomenon, from its origins to the struggle to
accurately define it. Section 3 will describe the rise of
the SBS by demonstrating that the impact of prudential
regulation on profitability has resulted in the exploita-
tion of regulatory arbitrage, leading to new forms of
financial innovation. In that context, dichotomy
between TBS and SBS and the previous Basel Accords
will be discussed. This analysis will provide a crucial
benchmark showing why market participants keep shift-
ing their activities towards the less stringently regulated
SBS. Section 4 will examine the specific example of
Basel IV and the main novelties therein. Basel IV has
arguably resulted in further debate, namely that the reg-
ulation of the TBS has deepened the resulting imbal-
ance between the TBS and the SBS. However, its
implementation has been postponed in order not to
additionally burden banks dealing with the current
coronavirus crisis. Could it be seen as a chance to cor-
rect what was omitted/add the SBS to the picture? Sec-
tion 5 includes policy recommendations and concludes
the discussion.
2 Defining Shadow Banking
2.1 The Origins of Shadow Banking
In 2007, at the annual economic policy symposium of
the Kansas City Federal Reserve in Jackson Hole,
Wyoming, American economist Paul McCulley coined
the term ‘shadow banking’ to describe a system that
posed a significant risk to financial stability because it
was untouched by regulation, has lain hidden for years
and operates on a subterranean level.7 Although ‘shadow
6. Even though in official documents the BCBS is not using the title ‘Basel
IV’ for any of the amendments, in this article, for the sake of brevity,
we will refer to Basel IV, meaning the set of changes completing Basel
III standards proposed at the end of 2015 and in March/April 2016 and
officially introduced in the document called ‘Finalisation of Basel III’. See
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basel III: Finalising Post-Crisis
Reforms’, Bank for International Settlements (7 December 2017),
www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf (last visited 28 December 2018). We
hereby acknowledge that the use of the term ‘Basel IV’ is not fully justi-
fied, as this set of standards does not introduce groundbreaking
changes in contrast to Basel I, Basel II and Basel III accordingly. How-
ever, it is commonly used in various analyses and papers and facilitates
the receipt of this article. See, for instance, ‘Basel III to “Basel IV”: What
Changed?’ Deloitte,https://www2.deloitte.com/mm/en/pages/risk/
articles/basel-iii-to-basel-iv.html (last visited 2 January 2019) or M.
Imeson, ‘“Basel IV” Raises Capital Requirements Even Higher’ Wolters
Kluwer Insights (16 February 2018), www.wolterskluwerfs.com/article/
basel-iv-raises-capital-requirements-even-higher.aspx (last visited 2 Jan-
uary 2019).
7. P.A. McCulley, ‘Teton Reflections’, 2 PIMCO Global Central Bank Focus
(2007).
banking’ is a relatively new term, the concept is not; the
origins arguably go back to 19th century England, when
Walter Bagehot wrote Lombard Street: A Description of
the Money Market.8
Bagehot observed that London banks operated in paral-
lel with financial firms known as ‘bill brokers’, who per-
formed much the same functions as banks, but were not
banks. Indeed, Bagehot noted that bill brokers were ‘a
special sort of banker who allow daily interest on depos-
its, and who for most of their money give security’ as
collateral to hedge risk.9 In modern day terms, Bage-
hot’s definition of ‘bill brokers’, who performed the
activity of converting bills into money, is very similar to
what is known today as shadow banking.10 Yet Walter
Bagehot is not the only commentator to recognise the
importance of the SBS over the decades. There have
been a host of other examples,11 one of which is descri-
bed by Friedrich Hayek, who, in 1931, observed that
There can be no doubt that besides the regular types
of circulating medium, such as coin, bank notes and
bank deposits, which are generally recognised to be
money or currency, and the quantity of which is
regulated by some central authority… there also
exists other forms of media of exchange… without
being subject to any central control.12
2.2 Defining Shadow Banking
The fact that the SBS now accounts for a significant
part of the financial system makes one wonder whether
the term ‘shadow banking’ is ‘pejorative’.13 Indeed, the
term automatically implies a sector of dubious legality
containing somewhat ‘clandestine’ and ‘nefarious’ con-
notations.14 Arguably, however, this explanation does
capture the activities that played a large part in precipi-
tating and exacerbating the financial crisis, such as
excessive self-interest, corporate greed, poor govern-
ance, high leverage and regulatory arbitrage; this is
potentially a reason for the ignominious reputation that
SBS now has.15
8. W. Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market
(1873).
9. Ibid., at 28.
10. M. Ricks, ‘Regulating Money Creation after the Crisis’, Harvard Law
School 75, at 87-88 (2011). See also, A.M. Pacces and H. Nabilou, ‘The
Law and Economics of Shadow Banking’, ECGI Working Paper Series in
Law 2017:1 at 5.
11. In 1993, the activity of what is known today as shadow banking was
referred to as the ‘parallel banking system’; see, generally, J.W. D’Árista
and T. Schlesinger, ‘The Parallel Banking System;’, Economic Policy
Institute Briefing Paper 1993; Mehrling, Pozsar, Sweeney & Neilson,
above n. 4, 1 at 1-2.
12. F.A. Hayek, Prices and Production (1931), at 113-114. See also,
J. Sweeney, ‘When Collateral is King’, 1Credit Suisse, at 2-4 (2013).
13. M. Singh, ‘The Economics of Shadow Banking’, 5 Reserve Bank of Aus-
tralia Conference Volume, at 22 (2013) (footnote 29).
14. J. Macey, ‘It’s All Shadow Banking, Actually’, 31 Review of Banking and
Financial Law 593, at 593 (2011-2012). See also, E. Lee, ‘Shadow
Banking System in China after the Global Financial Crisis – Why Shadow
Banks Can Distort the Capital Market Order’, 3 Peking University Law
Journal 361, at 362-363 (2015).
15. E. McBride and S. Pignal, ‘Shadow and Substance’, The Economist
(10 May 2014), www.economist.com/sites/default/files/20140510_
international_banking.pdf.
14
ELR September 2020 | No. 2 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000163
How, then, can shadow banking be defined? The term
‘shadow banking’ is often used as a catch-all term to
refer to a number of divergent institutions, instruments,
markets and activities. Its amorphous nature has argua-
bly become an obstacle to providing a clear and com-
monly accepted definition, the most commonly used one
being that of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which
defines shadow banking as ‘credit intermediation
involving entities and activities outside the regular
banking system’.16
The authors argue that trying to define shadow banking
in such a broad and all-encompassing way is a fruitless
endeavour. First, the scope of this definition is too wide;
the purpose appears to be more for surveillance and
monitoring than to provide an adequate workable defi-
nition. Second, this definition is not the most enlighten-
ing and raises more questions than it answers, questions,
such as who the entities are and what activities comprise
the SBS?17 Third, financial innovation and regulatory
change across multiple jurisdictions ensure that the
nature of the SBS is fluid and constantly evolving. It is
therefore submitted that trying to define shadow bank-
ing using this broad approach will always be a challenge;
identifying and summarising a complete set of charac-
teristics that can apply to past, present and future shad-
ow banking entities and activities may prove to be too
difficult a task.
Instead, an alternative approach to defining ‘shadow
banking’ could (and should) be adopted. A better
approach may be to construct a definition in relation to
the purpose for which shadow banking is used. For
example, the purpose of this article will be to explore
shadow banking as a market-based finance system that
has its roots in the money markets. The money market
is a market where transactions such as repos, securities
lending and derivatives contracts facilitate collateralised
finance; it is a market where long-term capital market
assets are funded with short-term money market liabili-
ties. ‘Shadow banking’ is, therefore, a ‘market-based
finance system’ that provides an attractive funding alter-
native to that offered by the TBS.18
16. Financial Stability Board, ‘Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight
and Regulation’, (27 October 2011) 1, www.fsb.org/wp-content/
uploads/r_111027a.pdf (last visited 28 December 2018). There are
other examples too, such as The Bank of England, which defines shad-
ow banking as “[i]nstruments, structures, firms, or markets which, alone
or in combination, replicate, to a greater or lesser degree, the core fea-
tures of commercial banks: monetary or liquidity services, maturity mis-
match, and leverage” – see P. Tucker, ‘Shadow Banking, Financing
Markets and Financial Stability’, Bank of England News Release (21 Jan-
uary 2010). The ECB defines shadow banking as‘[a]ctivities related to
credit intermediation, liquidity, and maturity transformation taking place
outside the regulated banking system’ – see K. Bakk-Simon, S. Borgioli,
C. Giron, H. Hempell, A. Maddaloni, F. Recine & S. Rosati, ‘Shadow
Banking in the Euro Area: An Overview’, 133 ECB Occasional Paper
Series April 2012: 1, at 5. This list is not exhaustive.
17. V. Lemma, The Shadow Banking System: Creating Transparency in the
Financial Markets (2016), at 18. See also E. Lee, ‘The Shadow Banking
System – Why It Will Hamper the Effectiveness of Basel III’, 008
University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper 1 2015:13.
18. Other commentators have defined shadow banking in a similar way.
For example, Alessio Pacces and Hossein Nabilou define shadow bank-
ing as ‘[l]everaging on collateral to support liquidity promises’ – see
The aforementioned description can be described as
‘functional’. A functional approach is able to unpack the
economic purposes of the transactions used within the
SBS. Such an approach is beneficial because it is
intended to capture the complex practices through
which money is created within the modern financial
system.19 Exploring the SBS in this way, that is,
through the lens of the transactions with which the SBS
functions, requires a ‘money view’.20 The money view
captures a distinctive element of the SBS: it is a market-
based finance system where debt relationships are
organised via tradable securities.21
It is precisely the presence of collateral that gives the
SBS its distinctive character. Collateral comes in the
form of marketable financial assets and, depending on
the liquidity of the collateral, implies the promise of
cash immediacy without making much of a loss. Collat-
eral can therefore be described as a mechanism that is
designed to hedge default risk. It is a safety net that
implies that should the borrower default, the collateral
can be liquidated to make good on the promise. Collat-
eral is the underpinning feature that makes such prom-
ises credible. As such, collateral is widely recognised as
having the equivalence of ‘money’,22 ‘cash’23 and ‘quasi-
money’.24 However, the implied liquidity of collateral,
and the fact that it can be considered to be as safe as
money, makes the contracts backed by the collateral,
such as repos, securities lending and derivatives, subject
to run,25 which was a fundamental issue during the
recent financial crisis.26
Pacces and Nabilou, above n. 10, at 11. Another similar definition is
provided by Daniela Gabor and Jakob Vestergaard, who state that
shadow banking is defined as ‘[r]epo liabilities supported by tradable
collateral’ – see D. Gabor and J. Vestergaard, ‘Towards a Theory of
Shadow Money’, Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper
2016:1, at 1.
19. Gabor and Vestergaard, above n. 18.
20. P. Mehrling, ‘Essential Hybridity: A Money View of FX’, 41(2) Journal
of Comparative Economics (2013).
21. Gabor and Vestergaard, above n. 18.
22. G. Yeowart, R. Parsons, E. Murray & H. Patrick, Yeowart and Parsons
on the Law of Financial Collateral (2016), at 155.
23. M. Singh, Collateral Reuse and Balance Sheet Space (2017), at 5.
24. E. Perotti, ‘The Roots of Shadow Banking’, 69 Policy Insight Centre for
Economic Policy Research December 2013:1.
25. Pacces and Nabilou, above n. 10.
26. While the general consensus is that the SBS has no backstop to prevent
‘runs’, on recent views, it could be implied that there is, actually, some
form of backstop. Therefore, two important developments should be
mentioned at this juncture. First, on 16 March 2020, Rana Foroohar, of
The Financial Times, noted that as a result of the coronavirus pandem-
ic, ‘central banks are backstopping the financial system with its repo
operations, as banks exchange government bonds for cash’ – this also
includes the shadow banking system. On this, see R. Foroohar, ‘How
the Virus Became a Credit Run’, Financial Times 1, at 17 (16 March
2020). Second, on 16 September 2019, the repo market experienced a
liquidity shortage. The US Federal Reserve stepped in and provided a
liquidity backstop by injecting more than $76 billion to provide market
participants with much needed cash. On this see The Economist,
“Repo-market ructions were a reminder of the financial crisis” (26 Sep-
tember 2019); see also, G. Tett, ‘The Repo Markets Mystery Reminds
Us that We are Flying Blind’, Financial Times (19 September 2019),
www.ft.com/content/35d66294-dadc-11e9-8f9b-77216ebe1f17.
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2.3 The Makings and Scope of Shadow Banking
Bearing in mind the origins of SBS, one could conclude
that it comprises a varied set of entities, activities and
transactions that function within the legal perimeter yet
outside the confines of prudential bank regulation.
Unlike the TBS, the SBS is not a single identifiable
system but a constantly evolving network consisting of a
varied and largely unrelated set of activities. The crux of
the SBS is that it provides an alternative source of fund-
ing to that offered by the TBS. It provides funding by
decomposing the process of credit intermediation into a
sequence of discrete operations, pursued by very differ-
ent types of financial market actors who interact across
the wholesale funding market and rely on it for fund-
ing.27 In doing so, the SBS participates in the activity of
credit intermediation by redistributing risk through
credit, maturity and liquidity transformation, raising
systemic risks, especially if combined with high lever-
age. It is through credit intermediation that shadow
banks provide funding, as will be elucidated in what fol-
lows:28
1. Leverage: As opposed to using equity, leverage
involves investing utilising borrowed funds;
2. Transferring credit risk: The purpose of transferring
risk is to pass it from one party who does not want
the risk to another party who is willing, for a fee, to
take on the burden of risk;
3. Maturity transformation: Involves borrowing funds
for short periods and investing or lending for longer
periods; and
4. Liquidity transformation: The term ‘liquidity’ repre-
sents the ease with which an asset can be turned into
cash. Liquidity transformation relates to assets, such
as cash, which is used to invest in less liquid assets,
such as bonds or derivatives.
The scope of the SBS is wide and varied. For example,
participants in the SBS include a broad range of bank
and non-bank financial intermediaries conducting vari-
ous activities. Players typically include, but are not
limited to, prudentially regulated banks, money market
mutual funds (MMMF), credit hedge funds, invest-
ment banks, large financial institutions, private individ-
uals, securitisation and special purpose vehicles.29 The
transactions through which these entities carry out their
activities are generally repos and securities lending and
transactions. Although the SBS has many touchpoints,
the scope of this article will focus on shadow banking
from a transactional perspective.
27. S. Ghosh, I. Gonzalez del Mazo & I. Otker-Robe, ‘Chasing the Shad-
ows: How Significant is Shadow Banking in Emerging Markets?’, 88 The
World Bank 1 (2012).
28. European Banking Authority, ‘EBA Issues Final Guidelines on Institutions
Exposures to Shadow Banking Entities and Recommends Approach to
Limiting Risks’, 15 December 2015, www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-issues-
final-guidelines-on-institutions-exposures-to-shadow-banking-entities-
and-recommends-approach-to-limiting-risks.
29. This list is not finite; in fact, virtually any entity operating in the financial
system can conduct shadow banking in one way or another.
3 The Rise of Shadow Banking
How, then, has the SBS risen to prominence? There are
four steps of reasoning, namely the imbalance in pru-
dential regulation between the TBS and the SBS,
resulting in a subsequent drop in profitability of the
TBS and the ensuing exploitation of regulatory arbi-
trage, thereby facilitating financial innovation.
3.1 Prudential Regulation
In order to illustrate the regulatory imbalance between
TBS and SBS, it is crucial to begin with the dichotomy
in the functioning of these two sectors. Subsequently,
the most relevant examples of prudential rules referring
to TBS only, namely the Basel Accords, preceding Basel
IV, shall be examined.
3.1.1 The Dichotomy between Traditional Banking and
Shadow Banking
Under the TBS, a bank is, among other things, an insti-
tution that grants loans and accepts deposits. Figure 1
depicts official banking and illustrates that the essence
of traditional bank intermediation is deposit taking and
loan making.
Figure 1 Traditional Banking: Deposit Taking and Loan
Making
The logical starting point in the figure is that there is a
depositor who deposits money with a bank. As long as
the total deposited amount in the bank account is below
the European Deposit Guarantee Scheme (EDGS)
threshold of €100,000, the funds will be insured.30 The
bank will then loan out these newly deposited funds to a
borrower, who, for instance, requires money for a mort-
gage. In return, the asset the bank will receive, which
will be collected upon over time, is the loan itself; this
ensures that the bank will receive a recurring income
stream for the life cycle of the loan. The bank itself is
the essential component; it is the intermediary between
the supply of funds from depositors and the demand for
loans from borrowers.31
Demand deposits are, however, of no practical use to
institutions and private individuals operating in the
30. Rec. 21 and 23 and Arts. 6(1) and (2) DGSD 2014/49.
31. R. Buckley, ‘The Changing Nature of Banking and Why It Matters’, in
R. Buckley, E. Avgouleas & D. Arner (eds.), Reconceptualising Global
Finance and Its Regulation (2016) 9, at 9-20.
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SBS.32 The fact that these entities often ‘deposit’ large
amounts of money for short periods ensures that the
threshold would be exceeded and that anything above
€100,000 is uninsured (and subject to bail-inable
claims33). This means that an entity depositing more
than €100,000 in the TBS could face a capital loss
should the bank face difficulties.34
Understandably, most market participants prefer risk-
free liquid claims. As such, the SBS has created an
alternative of demandable debt not subject to prudential
regulation and credibly backed by a direct claim on liq-
uidity.35 Within the SBS, when market participants
want a safe place to house their capital, raise funds or
borrow securities, they generally do so through the use
of collateralised finance transactions. The SBS’ distinc-
tive liquidity guarantee arises from their issuing of col-
lateralised financial credit in repo, securities lending and
derivatives transactions. As illustrated by Figure 2, the
SBS is functionally equivalent to the TBS because debt
contracts in the SBS are backed by FC (financial collat-
eral), just as debt contracts in the TBS are backed by the
EDGS.
In both transactions outlined in the figure, the TBS and
the SBS perform similar functions through ‘maturity
transformation’. The TBS engages in maturity transfor-
mation when it uses deposits (such as monthly wages),
which are short-term, to fund loans (such as mortgages)
32. A. Krishnamurthy, ‘How Debt Markets Malfunctioned in the Crisis’,
24(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, at 9-10 (2010).
33. The EDGS only insures deposits of up to €100,000 in the EU. Therefore,
anything above this amount that is deposited within a credit institution
becomes ‘unsecured’ and a ‘bail-inable’ claim should the bank fall into
trouble. On this see Art. 44(2)(a) of the Bank Recovery and Resolution
Directive 2014/59/EU (BRRD). A recent example of unsecured deposits
being written down to zero was on 5 October 2015, where the Danish
Bank ‘Andelskassen JAK Slagelse’ applied the BRRD – on this see the
European Parliament, ‘Bail-Ins in Recent Banking Resolution and State
Aid Cases’, (7 July 2016), www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
IDAN/2016/574395/IPOL_IDA%282016%29574395_EN.pdf.
34. Gabor and Vestergaard, above n. 18, at 10.
35. Perotti, above n. 24, at 1.
that are longer-term.36 The SBS does something similar
through repo by raising short-term funds in the money
markets secured with FC. The collateral taker can then
use the acquired collateral to raise more cash and so on,
thereby stimulating liquid and efficient markets.37
Generally, the maturity of a repo is overnight, with the
debt contract rolled over (renewed) on a daily basis.
This implies a confidence in immediacy because of its
short maturity as it is routinely rolled over.38 In addi-
tion, Aaa government bonds are often used as FC to
secure the repo, and the safety of the debt contract is
dependent on the quality of the FC (and the applicable
level of margin). Aaa government bonds are deemed to
be of the highest quality, most liquid and therefore the
safest form of FC as they are underpinned by a credible
government. As such, it is generally unnecessary for
market participants to do any due diligence on, or to
determine the provenance of, the government bond
because its value is known and accepted by all.
3.1.2 Basel Accords before Basel IV
As shown earlier, TBS and SBS play similar roles in the
economy when it comes to funding and broader maturi-
ty transformation. However, the TBS is subject to pru-
dential regulation, and many commentators argue that
the evolution of prudential regulation, such as the Basel
Accords, has inadvertently fuelled the growth of the
SBS.39 In particular, the Basel Accords are both expen-
sive and burdensome for banks, and regulators are
essentially forcing banks to disclose information and
hold minimum capital reserves. According to the Basel
36. See also Figure 1 for a visual depiction.
37. The collateral giver can then use the acquired cash to buy more securi-
ties (which are longer term).
38. The opposite is also the case where the buyer in the repo can demand
his cash back by not rolling over the repo. See Perotti, above n. 24, at
1.
39. B. Baur and P. Wackerbeck, ‘Into the Shadows: How Regulation Fuels
the Growth of the Shadow Banking Sector and How Banks Need to
React’, European Financial Review (19 June 2013),
www.europeanfinancialreview.com/?p=1065 (last visited 28 December
2018).
Figure 2 Functional Equivalence of Traditional Banking and Shadow Banking
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Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the aim of
the Basel Accords is to:
Strengthen global capital and liquidity rules with a
goal of promoting a more resilient banking sector.
The objective of the reforms is to improve the bank-
ing sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from
financial and economic stress, whatever the source,
thus reducing the risk of spill-over from the financial
sector to the real economy… The Committee’s com-
prehensive reform package addresses the lessons of
the financial crisis. Through its reform package, the
Committee also aims to improve risk management
and governance as well as strengthen banks’ transpar-
ency and disclosures. Moreover, the reform package
includes the Committee’s efforts to strengthen the
resolution of systemically significant cross-border
banks.40
Subjecting the TBS to the Basel Accords has the effect
of moderating financial stability by protecting and mini-
mising the risk to depositors and governments. Yet from
a commercial perspective, the Basel Accords are costly
and burdensome because banks have to continually alter
their business model to comply with incoming regula-
tion, which ultimately impedes profitability.41 There is
therefore an argument whether the Basel Accords are
effective. Regulation is arguably effective when, on the
one hand, risk is minimised, while on the other, benefits
are maximised.42 Yet finding the optimal regulatory bal-
ance has proved to be ‘something of a holy grail, highly
desirable but illusory and difficult to achieve’.43
It has been widely argued that Basel I and II contributed
to the 2008 financial crisis.44 In particular, the prolifera-
tion of off-balance sheet exposures and inadequate
growth of banks’ capital undermined Basel II’s risk-
weighted capital regulation regime. Moreover, after this
global downturn Basel III came into effect, which signif-
icantly amended Basel II and was aimed at preventing
40. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basel III: A Global Regulatory
Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems’, (December
2010), www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf (last visited 28 December 2018).
41. Profitability will be discussed in greater detail later.
42. P. Fergusson, ‘Regulation’s Negative Effect on Productivity’, Financial
Times 8 (15 June 2018), www.ft.com/content/
85c8578a-6d91-11e8-852d-d8b934ff5ffa (last visited 2 January 2019).
43. J. Bjorkholm and V. Johansson, ‘Debt Versus Equity: In a Low Interest
Rate Environment’ (Master Thesis), at 3-4 (2015). See also, R. Pike and
B. Neale, Corporate Finance and Investment: Decisions and Strategies
(1993), at 325.
44. Basel II adopted several of the Basel I requirements. See F. Cannata and
M. Quagliariello, ‘The Role of Basel II in the Subprime Financial Crisis:
Guilty or Not Guilty?’, CAREFIN Research Paper No. 3/09, 2009:15,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1330417 (last vis-
ited 2 January 2019); A. Cornford, ‘Revising Basel II: The Impact of the
Financial Crisis and the Implications for Developing Countries’, G-24
Discussion Paper Series No. 59 2010, https://unctad.org/en/Docs/
gdsmdpg2420102_en.pdf (last visited 2 January 2019); Provisions of
Basel II are also often mentioned as contributing to the crisis in the
comprehensive analyses of the 2008 downturn, see Tooze, above n. 1,
or A. Admati and M. Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s
Wrong with Banking and What to Do About It (Princeton University
Press 2013).
another crisis by reducing financial and economic stress
and minimising the aftershock effects in the economy.45
Under Basel III, there are three specific requirements
that can be argued as being significant. First, in the EU
there is a capital adequacy regime requiring traditional
sector banks to maintain a set minimum capital level of
8%.46 This means that banks operating in the TBS are
required to hold a minimum ratio of capital to risk-
weighted assets (RWAs). By holding a percentage of
deposits and equity on the balance sheet, the ultimate
aim is to ensure the stability of the financial system by
keeping the TBS solvent. Additionally, Basel III intro-
duced a new countercyclical buffer, the aim of which is
to incentivise banks to increase capital cushions when
times are economically good and thus avoid the tempta-
tion to take more and more risk and invest all the capital
for the highest gain possible owing to favourable
economic conditions. In addition to these requirements,
global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), as
designated in accordance with the FSB’s annual list and
by national supervisors, are obliged to keep an addition-
al buffer.
In order to calculate the capital a bank needs to hold
against its assets, the Capital Requirements Regulation
(CRR) describes how to weigh a bank’s assets relative to
risk. This phenomenon is the so-called RWAs. Assets
that are safe and highly liquid, such as cash or gold, are
disregarded from the RWAs regime, are considered risk
free and have risk weight of 0; other assets that carry a
higher risk, such as loans to other institutions, are
assigned a higher risk weight. Then the amount of assets
is multiplied by its risk weight, and the sum of all
RWAs constitutes the denominator, whereas the
amount of capital needed will be in the numerator. Con-
sequently, the more risky assets the bank holds, the
more capital it has to maintain. Capital comes in two
forms: going concern and gone concern, each of which
will be discussed in turn.
i. Going concern capital is the type of capital that has a
loss absorbing capacity so that a bank can continue its
activities and remain solvent. This type of capital is
referred to as Tier 1 capital. Under Article 26 of the
CRR, Tier 1 capital consists of both Common Equity
Tier 1 capital (CET 1) and Additional Tier 1 capital
(AT 1). CET 1 can be capital instruments, share pre-
mium accounts, retained earnings and other reserves.
AT 1 capital is not defined in the CRR but must
comply with Article 52 (1) of the CRR. For example,
certain subordinated loans, hybrids and converti-
bles.47
ii. Gone concern capital helps ensure that depositors
and senior creditors can be repaid, should the bank
fail. This type of capital is called Tier 2 capital and is
defined under Article 71 of the CRR. Tier 2 capital
45. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, above n. 40, www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs189.pdf (last visited 2 January 2019).
46. Art. 92(1)(c) of the CRR 575/2013.
47. Such as a contingent convertible bond (CoCo), which is a fixed income
instrument that is convertible into equity if a prespecified trigger event
occurs.
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consists of capital instruments, subordinated loans
and share premium accounts.48
The minimum 8% capital requirement regime is com-
posed of the following – 6% Tier 1 capital, namely
4.5% of CET 1 and 1.5% of AT 1; and 2% Tier 2 capi-
tal.49 The G-SIB systemic buffer is prescribed individu-
ally according to the ‘systemic importance level’ of a
given institution. The FSB awards points for each of the
relevant categories, and G-SIBs are allocated into buck-
ets using this score. The additional capital percentages
vary from 1% for the lowest first bucket to 3.5% for the
fifth one.
Second, an underlying feature of the global financial cri-
sis was the build-up of excessive leverage in the TBS. In
many cases, banks built up excessive leverage, while
maintaining strong risk-based capital ratios. Basel III
seeks to restrict this by encouraging banks to take initia-
tives to reduce their balance sheets by placing a limit on
the size of activities a bank can develop compared with
its own capital. To achieve this, a minimum leverage
ratio has been proposed.50
Third, Basel III has introduced liquidity ratios. The
first is the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR).51 The
objective of the LCR is to promote the short-term resil-
ience of the liquidity risk profile of banks. It does this by
ensuring that banks have an adequate stock of unencum-
bered high-quality liquid assets that can be converted
immediately into cash to meet their liquidity needs for a
30 calendar-day liquidity stress scenario.52 The second
is the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR).53 The NSFR
requires banks to maintain a stable funding profile in
relation to the composition of their assets and off-bal-
ance sheet activities. A sustainable funding structure is
intended to reduce the likelihood that disruptions to a
bank’s regular funding sources will erode its liquidity
position in a way that would increase the risk of failure
and potentially lead to broader systemic stress.54
Yet the Basel Accords, which are both a micro and mac-
ro prudential tool, refer to the TBS only – they do not
apply to the SBS.55 In particular, the Basel Accords
have adversely influenced banks by ultimately placing
them at a competitive disadvantage compared with other
non-prudentially regulated financial institutions. The
TBS, whose primary aim is to maximise profits, have an
incentive to circumvent the stringent prudential rules
precisely because the Basel Accords are an impediment
48. Art. 63 of the CRR 575/2013.
49. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, above n. 6, at 137,
www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/dco424.pdf (last visited 2 January 2019). See
also, M. Haentjens and P. De Gioia-Carabellese, European Banking and
Financial Law (Routledge 2015), at 101-105.
50. Arts. 429-430 of the CRR 575/2013.
51. Art. 412 of the CRR 575/2013.
52. Haentjens and De Gioia-Carabellese, above n. 49. See also, Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision, above n. 6, at 137, www.bis.org/bcbs/
publ/d424.pdf (last visited 2 January 2019).
53. Art. 428 of the CRR 575/2013.
54. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basel III: The Net Stable
Funding Ratio’ (2014), www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.pdf (last visited
2 January 2019).
55. Lee, above n. 17.
to their primary function. The SBS, in particular, has
proved to be a popular route for various entities because
it is a sector that is subject to less stringent rules. This
imbalance has given impetus to the development of the
SBS because it continues to remain untouched by pru-
dential standards. As mentioned earlier, the SBS ‘per-
forms much the same functions as traditional banking,
but the names of the players are different and the regu-
latory structure is light… to non-existent.’56
One could argue that SBS, owing to its close relation-
ship with TBS, actually remains under some regulatory
influence of Basel standards applicable directly to banks.
It is indeed true that banks are often part of the same
financial conglomerate as SBS entities, and many of the
rules apply on a consolidated basis to all institutions
within the conglomerate. Also, banks have to take into
account exposures to SBS firms in their capital calcula-
tions. However, still many ways remain for the banks or
the parent companies to avoid such ‘indirect influence’.
They could do it by establishing, for instance, special
purpose vehicles (SPVs) or even subsidiaries, depending
on the particular national legal regime. Also, the risk
weights of SBS-stemming assets are rarely very low.
Consequently, as long as SBS is not directly regulated
in a prudential manner, the problem described in this
contribution will persist.
It could also be contested that repos57 and securities
lending transactions58 are regulated under the Securities
Financing Transactions Regulation (SFTR).59 How-
ever, despite numerous publications identifying these
transactions as a major source of systemic risk, it is
unfortunate that this is an area yet to be substantially
tackled.60 The SFTR, for example, aims to create a safer
and more transparent financial system by placing addi-
tional requirements on market participants entering into
56. G. Gorton and A. Metrick, ‘Regulating the Shadow Banking System’,
Brookings Paper on Economic Activity 261, at 261-262 (2010) (empha-
sis added).
57. Art. 3(9) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2365 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 25 November 2015 on transparency of securities
financing transactions and of reuse and amending Regulation (EU) No
648/2012.
58. Arts. 3(7) and (11)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2015/2365 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on
transparency of securities financing transactions and of reuse and
amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
59. Regulation (EU) 2015/2365 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 25 November 2015 on transparency of securities financing
transactions and of reuse and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
60. V. Constancio, ‘Margins and Haircuts as a Macroprudential Tool’, Vice-
President of the ECB, at the ESRB international conference of the mac-
roprudential use of margins and haircuts (6 June 2016),
www.esrb.europa.eu/news/speeches/date/2016/html/
sp160606.en.html. See also, Financial Stability Board, ‘Global Monitor-
ing Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation 2018’, (4 February
2019), 1 at 25, www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P040219.pdf;
D. Heremans and A. Pacces, ‘Regulation of Banking and Financial Mar-
kets’, in R.J. Van Den Bergh and A.M. Pacces (eds.), Regulation and
Economics (2012) 558, at 560; M. Raffan and J. Benjamin, ’Wholesale
Markets and the Limits of Regulation’, International Financial Law
Review 1, at 1 (2014); M. Thiemann, M. Birk & J. Friedrich, ‘Much Ado
About Nothing? Macro-Prudential Ideas and the Post-Crisis Regulation
of Shadow Banking’, Kolner Zeitschrift fur Sozialpsychologie 259
(2018).
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securities financing transactions. The approach taken by
the SFTR requires securities financing transactions to
adhere to:
– The reporting requirement: securities financing trans-
actions must be reported to trade repositories;61
– The disclosure requirement: transparency and disclo-
sure obligations by Undertakings for Collective
Investment in Transferable Securities Directive
(UCITS) management companies, UCITS invest-
ment companies and Alternative Investment Fund
Managers (AIFMs) requiring periodic reports
informing investors of securities financing transac-
tions and total return swaps;62 and
– The collateral reuse requirement: prior risk disclosure
and written consent before counterparties are permit-
ted to reuse or re-hypothecate assets.63
However, commentators remain sceptical, arguing that
the SFTR does no
more than provide another red flag in a sea already
full of flags… The principles are noble but when
there is so much regulatory change in the market,
surely the goal should be to focus
on the implementation of tangible and meaningful
reforms.64
So the fact that regulation in the SBS is not as compre-
hensive (or direct) as the TBS, and the fact that the SBS
performs very similar functions to the TBS, places the
SBS at a competitive advantage precisely because credit
intermediation is performed outside the prudential reg-
ulatory framework. This competitive advantage
becomes particularly acute when it is discovered that the
61. Art. 4 of Regulation (EU) 2015/2365 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 25 November 2015 on transparency of securities financ-
ing transactions and of reuse and amending Regulation (EU) No
648/2012.
62. Arts. 13 and 14 of Regulation (EU) 2015/2365 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on transparency of
securities financing transactions and of reuse and amending Regulation
(EU) No 648/2012.
63. Art. 15 of Regulation (EU) 2015/2365 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 25 November 2015 on transparency of securities
financing transactions and of reuse and amending Regulation (EU) No
648/2012.
64. T. Dilks and A. Datoo, ‘Danger Signs’, Lexology 1, at 2 (2016).
net credit growth of the economy since the global crisis
has come from the SBS rather than traditional banking
channels.65 As such, the importance of the SBS to the
economy as a whole cannot be overemphasised. How-
ever, crucial to the continued growth of the economy,
and the stability of the SBS, there are calls for regula-
tion and effective oversight, in the hope of preventing
another global economic meltdown.66
3.2 Profitability
The further step in the rise of the SBS relates to profita-
bility. While it is not disputed that the tightening of
prudential regulation strengthens the resilience of the
TBS, the flipside is that it does so by limiting the profit-
ability of the TBS. The upward trajectory of forcing the
TBS to strengthen capital and liquidity has the para-
doxical effect of negative trajectories for banks’ profita-
bility in the EU. A recent study by Roland Berger (see
Figure 3) demonstrates that the profitability of EU
banks, as compared with that of US banks, has
decreased by 9% between 2009 and 2015. This drop in
profitability poses a real challenge for European banks,
considering the low interest rates, economic growth and,
significantly, regulatory pressure and the associated
costs.67
While there is currently no empirical evidence for a
causal relationship between regulatory pressure and
profitability, along with many other factors that have
contributed to a decrease in profitability, such as the
65. R. Davies, ‘The Moonshine of our Times: The Global Rise of Shadow
Banking’, The International Economy 70, 71 (2015). See also, S. Cali-
mani, G. Halaj & D. Zochowski, ‘Stimulating Fire-Sales in a Banking and
Shadow Banking System’, 46 ESRB Working Paper Series (June 2017).
66. Financial Stability Board, ‘Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report
2015’, (12 November 2015), 2. See also, Financial Stability Board, ‘Poli-
cy Framework for Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow
Banking Entities’, (29 August 2013), www.fsb.org/wp-content/
uploads/r_130829c.pdf (last visited 2 January 2019); Z. Liansheng, ‘The
Shadow Banking System of China and International Regulatory Cooper-
ation’, Centre for International Governance Innovation 1, at 10 (2015).
67. T. Quesnel, M. Pfeiffer & D. Johner, ‘Implications of Ongoing “Basel
IV” Debates’, Roland Berger 1, at 4 (2017). See also, S. Schneider,
G. Schrock, S. Koch & R. Schneider, ‘Basel “IV”: What’s Next for
Banks?’, Global Risk Practice (2017); L. Amorello, ‘Beyond the Horizon
of Banking Regulation: What to Expect From Basel IV’, 58 Harvard
International Law Journal 21, at 37 (2016).
Figure 3 Opposite Trajectories: Profitability of EU/USA Banks
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Eurozone crisis, this drop in profitability implies that
regulatory pressure and the associated costs pose a real
challenge for EU banks (see Section 4.3).68 As explained
further on, Basel IV may contribute to the overall regu-
latory burden by increasing the capital requirements in
the arbitrary way of an output floor and restricting the
use of the IRB. Such a situation may ensure that profits
could continue to plunge. Sinking profitability consti-
tutes a significant incentive for the TBS to migrate
activities to the less regulated SBS.69
3.3 Regulatory Arbitrage
A third aspect in relation to the rise of the SBS is regu-
latory arbitrage. Given that the TBS is so heavily
regulated, consequently impeding profitability, it is
unsurprising that there is an incentive to circumvent the
rules by exploiting regulatory arbitrage and migrating
activities to the SBS.70 Regulatory arbitrage can be
defined as the restructuring of financial activities to cir-
cumvent burdensome regulation. The central issue is
that as regulation within the TBS tightens, by default
the SBS will continuously gain traction. This argument
becomes particularly acute when we discover that
it takes roughly two hours to assemble a team of
finance geeks and lawyers to devise a product or
transaction that will bypass any new rule or regula-
tion coming our way.71
According to Charles Goodhart, effective regulation of
the TBS is indeed very difficult to achieve. There is a
pertinent argument that regulation of the TBS is self-
defeating because there will always be a way to circum-
vent the rules.72 The regulation of the TBS is self-
defeating because of the so-called boundary problem.
The boundary problem holds that as one level of the
TBS becomes regulated, or starts the process of regula-
tion, there is an incentive for financial market actors to
scramble over the boundary into the less stringently
regulated SBS to conduct business. Owing to a continu-
al drive to maximise profits, the boundary problem then
becomes perpetual because as regulation imposes new
68. Amorello, above n. 67.
69. Davies, above n. 65, at 70-72.
70. G. Buchak, G. Matvos, T. Pskorski & A. Seru, ‘Fintech, Regulatory Arbi-
trage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks’, 130(3) Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 453 (2018). See also, D. Nuoy (Chair of the Supervisory Board
of the ECB), ‘Gaming the Rules or Ruling the Game? – How to Deal
with Regulatory Arbitrage’, (15 September 2017),
www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2017/html/
ssm.sp170915.en.html.
71. A. Nesvetailova, ‘The Evolution of Nowhere Banking’, Risk & Regula-
tion 6, at 6-7 (Spring, 2014).
72. C. Goodhart, ‘The Emerging New Architecture of Financial Regulation’,
Centre for Financial Studies Working Paper 2011:1, at 25,
www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/57352/1/657391263.pdf (last vis-
ited 2 January 2019). See also, C. Goodhart, The Central Bank and the
Financial System (Palgrave Macmillan 1995), at 337; P. Drysdale,
Reform and Recovery in East Asia (Routledge 2003), at 40; L. Baxter,
‘Baxter Discusses Financial Regulation in Europe, Asia’, Duke Law News
(12 October 2012), https://law.duke.edu/news/baxter-discusses-
financial-regulation-europe-asia/ (last visited 2 January 2019);
A.G. Haldane, ‘Constraining Discretion in Bank Regulation’ (9 April
2013) speech given at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 14.
costs and burdens, it will consequently facilitate regula-
tory arbitrage.73
There is not only an economic significance correlated
with regulatory arbitrage, but also geographical signifi-
cance. For example, low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions are
regularly exploited to take advantage of tax, regulatory,
legal and administrative features inherent in these juris-
dictions.74 As such, the SBS has a global reach because
the sectors’ activities span across geographical jurisdic-
tions, which results in cross-border implications.75 Dif-
ferent regulatory and legal frameworks across various
jurisdictions potentially provide a safe harbour for the
SBS to arbitrage the rules because of the difficulty in
monitoring or curbing the activities that spread across
the globe.76
3.4 Financial Innovation
The final aspect of the rise to prominence of the SBS is
the development of financial innovation. While many
commentators view regulatory arbitrage as a negative,
regulatory arbitrage can also be viewed positively as it
facilitates financial innovation by creating new ways to
conduct business. The SBS is a case in point, given that
there is now a genuine economic demand for services
conducted in the SBS. Competition from financial firms
specialising in niche markets offering an above market
yield has allowed financial innovation to flourish, result-
ing in an increased demand for novel and adaptable
financial products. Many entities, activities and transac-
tions operating in the SBS now have valid and valuable
economic and financial market functions. The SBS is,
indeed, a hotbed of innovation. It is unstifled by the
rules, and the growth of the SBS may be understood as
one consequence of evolving legal and regulatory struc-
tures stemming from the TBS.77
4 Basel IV: Another Brick in
the Wall
4.1 Basel IV – Main Novelties
The most recent Basel Accord, Basel IV, is complemen-
tary to Basel III in that Basel IV was introduced to
repair the omissions of Basel III. By doing so, Basel IV
‘now completes the global reform of the regulatory
73. C. Goodhart, Too Important to Fail – Too Important to Ignore
(Parliament Publications, House of Commons 2010), at 11.
74. For example, the Cayman Islands, Jersey, Ireland, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands. On this see J. Deacon, Global Securitisation and CDOs
(Wiley 2004), at 46.
75. R. Gandhi, ‘Danger Posed by Shadow Banking Systems to the Global
Financial System – The Indian Case’, International Conference on
Governance & Development: Views from G20 Countries 1, at 4-5
(2014), www.bis.org/review/r140827b.pdf (last visited 2 January
2019). See also, P.R. Wood, Project Finance, Securitisation and Subor-
dinated Debt (Sweet&Maxwell 2007), at 6-014-6-017.
76. E. Lee, ‘Shadow Banking System in China After the Global Financial Cri-
sis’, 024 University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper 1
2015:1-2, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2631343 (last visited 2 January 2019).
77. M. Singh, Collateral and Financial Plumbing (RISK 2016), at 35-39.
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framework which began following the onset of the glob-
al financial crisis.’78 It also constitutes the most recent
global regulatory initiative, the consequences of which
boost the further expansion of the SBS sector.
Under Basel III the most important requirement is
arguably that of capital adequacy, which is reliant on the
amount of RWAs. However, the issue of how RWAs
were to be calculated had never been comprehensively
regulated in any of the Basel Accords.79 Banks could
either apply the standardised approach (SA) on the basis
of risk weights determined by the supervisors or recog-
nised credit rating agencies or use the internal ratings-
based model (IRB), which allows the banks themselves
to establish their own criteria for risk-weighting. This
choice was left to the banks’ discretion. In practice this
means that banks could have a direct influence on the
final level of the required regulatory capital. It seems
hard to find a better incentive for gaming such a calcula-
tion process.80 The Economist called the IRB resulting
capital ‘do-it-yourself capital’.81 The significant varia-
tion in RWAs across banks with very similar portfolios
only served to justify that nickname.82 Basel IV aims to
solve this problem by ‘restoring credibility in the calcu-
lation of RWAs and improving comparability of banks’
capital ratios.’83
Basel IV introduces four main novelties. First, the use
of IRB to calculate credit risk84 has been banned with
respect to specific types of exposures. In the case of
equity, only the SA is permitted. In turn, the risk
weight of exposures to banks and other financial institu-
tions, as well as particular corporates,85 should not be
estimated using the advanced IRB, while the foundation
IRB variation is permissible.86
78. Mario Draghi quoted in C. Binham, M. Arnold & C. Jones, ‘New Basel
Rules on Capital Hit European Banks’, Financial Times (7 December
2017), www.ft.com/content/ec3fb98e-db67-11e7-a039-
c64b1c09b482 (last visited 2 January 2019).
79. Basel I praised the SA, but then it changed, and in both Basel II and III
regulators left some discretion regarding the choice of either the stand-
ardised or the internal approach. As a result, banks were able to decide
how to calculate RWAs and, therefore indirectly, how much capital to
hold.
80. For an in-depth analysis of how and why RWAs calculations vary see V.
Le Leslé and S. Avramova, ‘Revisiting Risk-Weighted Assets. Why Do
RWAs Differ Across Countries and What Can Be Done About It?’, IMF
Working Paper 12/90 (2012), www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/
2012/wp1290.pdf (last visited 2 January 2019).




82. R. Turk-Ariss, ‘Heterogeneity of Bank Risk Weights in the EU: Evidence
by Asset Class and Country of Counterparty Exposure’, IMF Working
Paper 17/137 (2017), www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/
2017/06/09/Heterogeneity-of-Bank-Risk-Weights-in-the-EU-Evidence-
by-Asset-Class-and-Country-of-44965 (last visited 2 January 2019).
83. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Finalising Basel III IN BRIEF’,
(2017), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424_inbrief.pdf (last visited
2 January 2019).
84. Credit risk is the risk linked directly with lending. It refers to the poten-
tial loss caused by a borrower defaulting on its debt repayment.
85. Corporates belonging to groups with total consolidated revenues
exceeding EUR 500m.
86. Advanced IRB relies exclusively on the data and procedures established
internally by the given bank. In contrast, foundation IRB is partially
Second, owing to the high level of unpredictability
borne by operational risk,87 the only method to quantify
such risk is by utilising the SA. Internal models have
been assessed as too unreliable in this regard.88 Certain-
ly, SA is able to increase comparability between institu-
tions and the level playing field in this regard. On the
other hand, given the vast disparities between modern
banking business models, it can be harmful to some of
them, imposing a ‘one size fits all’ policy.
The third novelty completes the risk-dependent capital
adequacy framework for G-SIBs with a new risk-inde-
pendent requirement. It imposes a special extra leverage
ratio on G-SIBs ‘to maintain the relative incentives pro-
vided by both [risk-weighted and risk-independent –
K.P.] capital constraints’.89 The final leverage ratio
these entities have to meet is a sum of a base 3%
requirement and a half of risk-weighted higher-loss
absorbency requirement as determined annually by the
FSB. For instance, according to the 2019 FSB list,90
Citigroup is placed in bucket no. 3 (2%). Thus, it will
be obliged to meet the leverage ratio buffer at the level
of 4% (3% +0.5×2%).
Fourth, and arguably the most controversial require-
ment included in the Basel IV package, is the introduc-
tion of the output floor. It is a fixed level of all RWAs
calculated using the SA, below which the amount of
RWAs based on the IRB cannot fall. The threshold
chosen is 72.5% of RWAs calculated with the SA. For
instance, if the bank uses the IRB to count its RWAs,
then the resulting amount cannot be lower than 72.5%
of this bank’s RWAs calculated using the SA:
IRB-based calculation ≥ 72.5% of SA-based calculation.
If the IRB-based calculation falls below 72.5% of the
SA-based calculation, the bank is obliged to use the
72.5% of the SA-based result as its RWAs amount in
the process of calculating the required regulatory capital
to be held.
However necessary these reforms sound, its final shape
is far from perfect. Neither ‘restored credibility’ nor
‘facilitated comparability’91 that regulators aim for is
entirely worth the price that the EU banks will have to
pay to comply with those requirements. Most impor-
tantly, the negative consequences to be expected in con-
dependent on supervisors’ recommendations. Advanced IRB is the form
of internal model that allows the bank to calculate internally probability
of default, loss given default and exposure at default, while by Founda-
tion IRB only probability of default can be calculated internally, when
the rest of the factors are based on pre-established values.
87. Operational risk refers to broadly understood operations that a bank
undertakes. Losses could be incurred, for instance, by some internal
procedural failure or even by external factors.
88. BCBS (n. 83).
89. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘High-Level Summary of Basel
III Reforms’, (2017), www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf (last
visited 2 January 2019).
90. Financial Stability Board, ‘2019 List of Global Systemically Important
Banks (G-SIBs)’, (22 November 2019), www.fsb.org/wp-content/
uploads/P221119-1.pdf (last visited 30 May 2020).
91. BCBS (n. 83).
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nection with the implementation of these rules could
result in an exodus into the less regulated SBS.
4.2 Basel IV – General Consequences
4.2.1 Regulatory Capital
Even though one of the main articulated promises con-
cerning Basel IV was no increase in capital require-
ments,92 it is probable they will rise indirectly as a result
of the change in the models’ regime and output floors.
Already after the announcement of the proposal, many
analyses93 delivered data concerning the future amount
of required capital. The exact numbers vary, but all of
the reports have one thing in common – they conclude
that the increase will take place and be noticeable for
banks. According to statistics from the BCBS (which is
one of the more optimistic prognoses94), internationally
active banks will experience a capital shortfall of EUR
90.7 billion.95 European Banking Authority’s assessment
differs drastically – according to the watchdog capital,
the shortfall at the EU’s largest banks would reach EUR
135 billion.96
To comprehend why banks will be obliged to gather
more capital, it is crucial to stress the interdependency
between final capital requirements and models of RWAs
calculation. As the Basel IV reform limits the use of the
IRB approach, known for being more accurate and more
institution tailored, banks will be forced to rely on the
SA models, constructed by their supervisors. That,
combined with an automatically triggered output floor,
means an increase of the RWAs amount constituting
denominator in the capital buffers’ calculation. An
increase in the denominator means a decrease in the
overall result. Thus, banks holding the same amount of
equity/deposits as before Basel IV will suddenly find
themselves in breach of capital requirements. Con-
sequently, the capital that banks are expected to have at
their disposal will have to rise, even though the require-
92. E. Price, ‘Operational Risk Framework Hints at Basel IV’, International
Financial Law Review (21 March 2016), www.iflr.com/Article/
3539581/Operational-risk-framework-hints-at-Basel-IV.html (last vis-
ited 2 January 2020).
93. ‘Basel IV: Big Bang – Or the Endgame of Basel III? BCBS Finalises
Reforms on Risk Weighted Assets (RWA)’, PWC Analysis (December
2017), www.pwc.com/sg/en/publications/assets/basel-iv-big-bang-or-
endgame-of-basel-iii-201712.pdf (last visited 2 January 2019); UBS
reports and UniCredit estimates quoted in ‘The Revised Basel Bank-




94. For instance, McKinsey & Company estimates the capital shortfall to be
around EUR 120 billion. See S. Koch, R. Schneider, S. Schneider & G.
Schröck, ‘Bringing Basel IV into Focus’, McKinsey (November 2017),
www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/our-insights/bringing-
basel-iv-into-focus (last visited 2 January 2020).
95. B. Groendahl, N. Comfort, S. Brush & E. Robinson, ‘Banks Emerge Win-
ners from Final Post-Crisis Capital Rules’, Bloomberg (8 December
2017), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-08/banks-breath-
sigh-of-relief-as-basel-deal-limits-capital-impact (last visited 2 January
2019).
96. See EBA’s press release from 2 July 2019, https://eba.europa.eu/eba-
basel-assessment-sees-impact-driven-by-large-banks (last visited
15 April 2020).
ments themselves will stay the same. Banks’ representa-
tives point to the severe methodological flaws in this
logic, linked to the fact that half of the whole capital
increase will stem from output floors,97 which were
designed as a safety valve for correct RWA calculations,
not the main source of capital burden. Banks also stress
the probability that they will be overcapitalised.98 How-
ever, this argument from their side has been constantly
repeated since the first Basel III capital ratios were
announced.
There are still two valid threats that the frozen capital
could turn into reality. First, when banks need to raise
capital, they usually take on more debt, limit their lend-
ing activities and make credit expensive.99 Such deter-
rence from providing credit to the economy could fur-
ther result in an adverse impact on growth.100 Second,
the other way of achieving the required capital threshold
is to lower the return on equity (RoE). Analyses have
already demonstrated that owing to the Basel IV rules,
RoE could fall by 0.6% in the whole European banking
sector.101 This amount might not seem significant, but
profit-oriented investors are beginning to regain trust in
banks, which this decrease could easily undermine. Reg-
ulators are well aware of those threats, which was pro-
ven by their reaction to postpone Basel IV implementa-
tion triggered by the coronavirus crisis (see Section
4.3.).
4.2.2 More Risk and Deepened EU Fragmentation
One of the main aims of the Basel IV reforms was to
improve risk-dependent calculations, to limit manipula-
tive tendencies in the risk assessment and thus make the
whole system less risky. Paradoxically, it might turn the
other way around. Usually, banks assess the risk of bor-
rowers102 and try to be as risk averse as possible or
adjust the interest rate accordingly. However, Basel IV’s
output floor will impose an amount of RWAs, even if
their own IRB calculations come up with a lower result.
The banks will lose their main incentive to pick less ris-
97. As Christian Ossig of Association of German Banks pointed out during
the ‘Basel III: Are we done now?’ Conference in Frankfurt am Main (29
January 2018), the rise of capital caused by output floor amounts to
6.6%, which is half of the total 12.9% overall increase in capital
requirements.
98. See the remarks of James von Moltke, chief financial officer at Deutsche
Bank, in ‘Bankers Welcome Final Basel III Rules Through Gritted Teeth’,
Euromoney (13 December 2017), www.euromoney.com/article/
b1611h1m2wx315/bankers-welcome-final-basel-iii-rules-through-
gritted-teeth (last visited 2 January 2020).
99. Raising equity as a means of increasing capital is still arbitrarily consid-
ered to be much more expensive than borrowing, mainly in view of the
tax-deductability of interest rates’ costs. See Admati and Hellwig, above
n. 44.
100. See ‘Basel IV’, Banking&Insurance Sia Partners (30 January 2017),
http://en.finance.sia-partners.com/20170130/basel-iv (last visited
2 January 2020) or A. Kröner and C. Wallace, ‘A New Pain Threshold
for Banks’, Handelsblatt Global (11 October 2017), https://
global.handelsblatt.com/finance/a-new-pain-threshold-for-
banks-838791 (last visited 2 January 2020).
101. McKinsey, above n. 95.
102. For more on banks’ function as delegated monitors and their infor-
mation advantage as compared with the market, see D.W. Diamond,
‘Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring’, 51 The Review of
Economic Studies 393 (1984).
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ky borrowers, because their amount of RWAs may be
increased anyway. Additionally, when they inevitably
choose to move some activities into the SBS, the risk
will also rise, as ‘shadow’ operations are known to be
more profitable and riskier at the same time. As a result,
the whole banking system might actually become more,
not less risky.103
In addition, the European banking system is known for
having a very complex and fragmented structure. Not
only are the disparities between Eurozone and non-
Eurozone Member States noticeable, but also the way of
financing the economy in EU countries varies. The line
can be drawn between ‘The North’ and ‘The South’.
Specifically, banks in the Netherlands and Sweden or
Finland have their balance sheets full of mortgage loans
that, under new rules, could cause an increase in
required capital buffers.104 In contrast, southern banks
from Portugal, Italy or Spain hold much more sovereign
bonds, still considered to be risk free. Even though the
northern banks claim to be able to absorb the impact of
Basel IV, the differentiation in balance sheets across the
EU will increase, also misleadingly pointing to the
North as a riskier region. This could contribute to the
deepening of the fragmentation of the EU banking
system and jeopardise harmonisation efforts.
4.2.3 More of Competitive Disadvantage Towards the
US
The conflict of interest between the US and the EU
(particularly France and Germany, homes of the biggest
EU banks) was the main cause of the delay105 in com-
pleting Basel IV standards. After the new rules are
implemented, European banks will be put at a signifi-
cant competitive disadvantage in relation to their Amer-
ican counterparts for at least three reasons. First, the
US economy is financed differently than the EU econo-
my. In the US, almost 80% of financing comes from the
capital markets in comparison with only 20% provided
by the banks. In the EU, the statistics look exactly oppo-
site – when a European entrepreneur wants to expand
his business, he goes to the bank to get a loan, rather
than issuing equity. Hence, the balance sheets of Ameri-
can banks are, in general, less leveraged and thus less
risky.106 Second, the EU financial institutions have
much fewer opportunities of securitisation than their
US rivals, which leads to the situation that the loans
remain on balance sheets. More loans obviously increase
the amount of RWAs, and thus required capital. Also,
EU banks overall are weaker because of the delayed
103. Sia Partners, above n. 101.
104. Dutch banks estimate to have a 14-billion euro capital shortfall. See
Bloomberg, above n. 96.
105. Most of the changes were primarily proposed in March/April 2016, and
even in October 2017 it was not certain whether the standards would
be officially adopted. See C. Binham and J. Brunsden, ‘France Hardens
Stance Against Higher Bank Capital Requirements’, Financial Times (10
October 2017), www.ft.com/content/
ee8f42eb-422a-3dc9-92a2-8ceb7d9fb4ef (last visited 2 January 2020).
106. Surprisingly, that was the case even before and during the global finan-
cial crisis. Deutsche Bank reached the level of 50. See M. Choudhry and
G. Landuyt, The Future of Finance: A New Model for Banking and
Investment (Wiley 2010), at 46-50.
post-crisis recovery. When US banks were returning to
profit levels that prevailed before the 2008 downturn,107
EU banks had to face the sovereign debt crisis. Lastly,
the US regulators have already introduced the output
floors, and even at the level of 100%. Consequently, for
the US banking sector it makes no difference what Basel
IV rules prescribe on that matter. As the result of the
foregoing factors, European banks will suffer under new
Basel IV standards much more than the US institutions.
The investors would logically tend to choose the latter
entities over the former, knowing that US banks will not
be forced to increase their capital buffers at the deposi-
tors’ or shareholders’ cost.108
4.3 Basel IV – Implementation
Originally, provisions of Basel IV were supposed to be
implemented by 2022 with regard to risk and RWA cal-
culations and output floor of 72.5% was to be achieved
gradually by 2027. However, a new downturn came
quicker than expected when the coronavirus epidemic
forced whole nations into lockdown. Banks started to
vocalise the problems described above, threatening that
they would not have the capacity to support the real
economy.109 It has become definitely visible how bur-
densome the additional buffers are. Regulators and
supervisors all over the world started rolling back capital
requirements and freeing capital in the fear that banks
would not have enough resources to spend on lending.
In EU, apart from the European Central Bank (ECB)
capital-loosening actions, France, Germany and the
Netherlands gave up on the countercyclical buffer.110
Also, the BCBS caved in and introduced measures that
shall ‘free up operational capacity for banks and supervi-
sors as they respond to the economic impact of Cov-
id-19’.111 Specifically, it postponed the implementation
of Basel IV by one year, till the beginning of 2023. Even
though it is highly improbable that the final shape of the
Basel IV could be amended, this time until implementa-
tion could be wisely used by global regulators and
supervisors to reconsider striking some balance between
non-existent prudential rules on SBS and the constantly
growing body of standards applicable to TBS.
107. J. Lybeck, The Future of Financial Regulation. Who Should Pay for the
Failure of American and European Banks? (Cambridge University Press
2016), at 116.
108. D. Masoni, ‘Regulatory Angst Curbs Investor Appetite for European
Banks’, Reuters (5 December 2017), www.reuters.com/article/us-
europe-banks-capital-analysis/regulatory-angst-curbs-investor-
appetite-for-european-banks-idUSKBN1DZ28S (last visited 2 January
2020).
109. D. Crow, S. Morris & L. Noonan, ‘Banks Plead for Rethink Over Post-
Crisis Rules,’ Financial Times (19 March 2020), www.ft.com/content/




111. BCBS Press Release, Governors and Heads of Supervision announce
deferral of Basel III implementation to increase operational capacity of
banks and supervisors to respond to Covid-19, 27 March 2020,
www.bis.org/press/p200327.htm (last visited 15 April 2020).
24
ELR September 2020 | No. 2 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000163
5 Recommendations and
Conclusion
It is not disputed that risks and vulnerabilities are an
inherent characteristic of the SBS, especially consider-
ing that the SBS was central to the global crisis of
2008.112 One therefore has to wonder why the further
tightening of the TBS through the recent Basel IV was
introduced rather than efforts to dampen the inherent
systemic risks within the SBS.113 Nevertheless, Basel IV
has been introduced, which has created further negative
implications, especially with regard to profitability by
putting EU banks at a competitive disadvantage in rela-
tion to US institutions. Also, a further increase in capi-
tal requirements caused by the amendments in calcula-
tion models will adversely impact EU banking institu-
tions, and they will look for a path to circumvent it. As
such, the incentive for EU banks to continue to migrate
their activities into the shadows could not be more pro-
found.
Could the postponement of Basel IV implementation be
seen as a chance to fill the loophole of SBS regulation?
Could the institutions focused on combating economic
112. Financial Stability Board, ‘Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report
2017’, (5 March 2018), www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/
P050318-1.pdf (last visited 2 January 2020).
113. For an in-depth analysis of the potential regulatory solutions of non-
bank SIFIs, see D. Busch and M.B.J. van Rijn, ‘Towards Single Supervi-
sion and Resolution of Systemically Important Non-Bank Financial Insti-
tutions in the European Union’, 19(2) European Business Organization
Law Review 301 (2018).
externalities of Covid-19 pandemic also formulate pro-
visions for this omitted sector? Of course, while regula-
tion is necessary from a financial stability perspective,
the flip side is that over-regulation can have the per-
verse effect of limiting profitability and stifling innova-
tion (or it can be rolled back quickly once the crisis
strikes, as we can see it now). However, various com-
mentators remain sceptical that the SBS can ever be
comprehensively regulated. For example, some hold
that the SBS is far too diverse to be regulated effective-
ly, while others argue that regulatory efforts consistently
fail to catch up with new developments.114 Adding to
these comments, crucially, there is also a severe lack of
granular data within the SBS.115 Obviously, it is very
difficult to regulate something you do not know a huge
amount about, and, of course, we do not know what the
SBS will look like in the future in view of to its com-
plexity, diversity and constantly evolving nature.116
Supervisory bodies, such as the FSB,117 the European
114. S. Claessens and L. Kodres, ‘The Regulatory Responses to the Global
Financial Crisis: Some Uncomfortable Questions’, IMF Working Paper
14/46 6 (2014), www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp1446.pdf
(last visited 2 January 2019). See also, Davies, above n. 65.
115. J. Mazzacurati, ‘Haircuts in EU Securities Financing Markets’, ESMA
Report on Trends, Risks and Vulnerabilities 52, at 52 (2017).
116. H. Nabilou and A.M. Pacces, ‘The Law and Economics of Shadow Bank-
ing’, in I.H.Y. Chiu and I.G. MacNeil (eds.), Research Handbook on
Shadow Banking Legal and Regulatory Aspects (2018) 7.
117. There have been a host of publications by the FSB on the SBS, the most
recent being the FSB’s ‘Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report
2017’, (n. 112).
Table 1 Summary of Basel IV novelties
Basel IV
novelty





– Comparability (level playing field)
– Less risk of gaming the calculation
– Differences between exposures’ charac-
ter taken into account
– Less accuracy
– Capital shortfalls resulting
in indirect increase in capi-
tal requirements
– Useful, if determined individually
for each of institutions, taking into
account its business model





– Comparability (level playing field)
– Less risk of gaming the calculation
– Less accuracy (very impor-
tant with op risk, given
how institution-specific it is)
– Capital shortfalls resulting
in indirect increase in capi-
tal requirements
– Useful, if determined individually
for each of institutions, taking into
account its business model






– Completion of the G-SIB specific frame-
work (after G-SIB capital add-on)
– Depending on pretty arbi-
trary G-SIB designation
– Incentive to take on more
risk
– Necessary adjustment taking into
account systemicness of banks
Output
floor
– Final backstop preventing banks from
too low RWA result
– Arbitrary
– Half of the capital shortfall
stems from it
– Incentive to take on more
risk
– Arbitrary
– Unnecessary in the presence of
adequately formulated SA
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Securities and Markets Agency (ESMA)118 and the
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)119 have intro-
duced numerous publications on the issue of regulating
the SBS, but the fact remains that it is an issue yet to be
substantially tackled. The results to date are no greater
than piecemeal solutions. It is unfortunate that supervi-
sors and regulators alike do not seem to be tackling this
problem head on. But one thing is for sure, and perhaps
this answers why the focus has not been turned to the
SBS – if it were to be regulated to the similar severity of
the TBS, then, by default, the SBS will likely circum-
vent those rules and find alternative ways of engaging in
financial markets – which could, we think, lead us back
down the familiar dark path of 2007.
The authors would like to introduce three plausible pol-
icy recommendations that may be useful in the quest to
appropriately regulate the SBS.
5.1 Recommendation 1
Before even considering the gargantuan task of regulat-
ing the SBS, the first logical recommendation would be
to concentrate on gathering sufficient data because it is
impossible (and ineffective) to regulate something with-
out any. By imposing more stringent reporting require-
ments on entities, activities and transactions will ulti-
mately create a more comprehensive image of what
effective and targeted regulation should look like.120
5.2 Recommendation 2
The second recommendation is the possible regulation
of liquidity within the SBS. Within the TBS, liquidity
is an issue comprehensively regulated under the LCR
and the NSFR. Within the SBS, the use of FC and the
liquidity of those assets is left for market participants to
decide. The general idea is that as long as the parties are
in agreement about what securities are used as collateral,
it can be used as cash equivalent. Of course, this is dan-
gerous given that many financial securities are highly
volatile and subject to frequent and unpredictable intra-
day price fluctuations.
The authors recommend that collateral liquidity should
be regulated by way of a minimum liquidity cap. This
would mean that only certain predefined assets can be
used to secure a collateralised transaction commonly
used in the SBS-assets such as cash or highly rated debt,
118. The ESMA has also introduced numerous publications on shadow bank-
ing; for the most recent see: ‘ESMA Reports on Shadow Banking, Lever-
age and Pro-cyclicality’, (2016), www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/
esma-news/esma-reports-shadow-banking-leverage-and-pro-cyclicality
(last visited 2 January 2020).
119. The most recent ESRB publication on shadow banking is: ESRB ‘Macro-
prudential Use of Margins and Haircuts’, (2017), www.esrb.europa.eu/
pub/pdf/reports/
170216_macroprudential_use_of_margins_and_haircuts.en.pdf (last vis-
ited 2 January 2020).
120. Arts. 4 and 12 of the SFTR have reporting obligations – however, it is
currently uncertain how effective these provisions are given that ESMA
have recently issued a consultation on the matter. See ESMA, ‘Consul-
tation on Guidelines for Reporting Under Articles 4 and 12 SFTR’,
(29 July, 2019), www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/consultations/
consultation-guidelines-reporting-under-articles-4-and-12-sftr.
namely Aaa government bonds or investment grade
corporate bonds, for example.121
Since the global financial crisis, the assets posted as col-
lateral have, in general, taken a ‘flight to quality’. In
practice, liquidity and the promise of cash immediacy
are paramount when determining what is deemed ‘cash
equivalent’. The BCBS/IOSCO and the RTS have
helpfully provided EU market participants with an
informative list, which outlines the most liquid and saf-
est forms of collateral assets used to secure specific
derivatives transactions:122
– Cash;
– High-quality government and central bank securities;
– High-quality corporate bonds;
– High quality covered bonds;
– Equities included in major indices; and
– Gold.
To be ‘eligible’, the asset must meet the criteria negoti-
ated and documented in the ISDA Master Agreement
Credit Support Annex, e.g. which currencies the FC
may be in, what types of bonds/assets are allowed and
which haircuts are to be applied.123 Generally, cash in
the form of $USD, £GBP, €Euro and ¥Yen and highly
rated government securities of the USA, Canada, the
Netherlands, Germany, UK, France and Belgium are
the most liquid and therefore the most sought after form
of Eligible Credit Support.124 Depending on which
form of assets are used, the general rule is that as long as
the assets are liquid, can be valued mark-to-market and
meet the necessary regulatory requirements, and as long
as the parties are in agreement, the asset can be used as
cash equivalent.125
However, this matrix applies only to certain derivatives
transactions, not to all collateralised financial transac-
tions – namely repos and securities lending. The
authors propose to develop this collateral matrix by rec-
ommending that it applies to all collateralised transac-
tions. Any assets that do fall within these criteria would
become ‘ineligible’, and the collateral taker would there-
fore have to notify the collateral giver, by delivering a
‘Legal Ineligibility Notice’ outlining, among other
things, the reasons why the assets do not fulfil the eligi-
bility requirements.126
121. Of course, the list is not finite.
122. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Board of the Inter-
national Organization of Securities Commissions, ‘Margin Requirements
for Non-centrally Cleared Derivatives’, 1, at 17-18 (March, 2015),
www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d317.pdf. See also Art. 4 of the RTS, which
provides a comprehensive list of eligible collateral types.
123. Paras. 10 and 11(b)(ii), 1995 ISDA English Law CSA and Paragraphs 10
and 11(c)(ii), 2016 English Law CSA for Variation Margin.
124. See also, P.C. Harding and A.J. Harding, A Practical Guide to the 2016
ISDA Credit Support Annexes for Variation Margin (2018) Authors’
Foreword xi.
125. Yeowart, Parsons, Murray & Patrick, above n. 22, at 64-65. See also,
Singh, above n. 23, IMF Working Paper 1, at 5.
126. Paras. 9(e)-(h) and 11(c)(iii), 2016 English Law CSA for Variation Mar-
gin.
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5.3 Recommendation 3
The third recommendation of regulating the SBS is by
limiting the amount of leverage an institution can hold –
this can be done by minimum margin regulation. With-
in the SBS, leverage levels can, theoretically, be infinite.
Collateralised transactions facilitate leverage by enabling
financial institutions to borrow securities or cash ‘to
make leveraged bets on an already leveraged instru-
ment’.127 To build such positions, the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements has noted that in repos, for
example, “market participants use cash raised through
an initial repo transaction to buy securities which, in
turn, are repoed out to raise more cash to buy more
securities and so on… [ad infinitium].” With each trans-
action the leverage ratio increases because the re-use/re-
hypothecation of collateral allows market participants to
recursively leverage their positions, implying that there
could, theoretically, be infinite amounts of leverage.128
Prudentially regulated banks have comprehensive regu-
lation with regard to the amount of leverage they are
allowed to hold through Basel III’s minimum leverage
ratio.129 The European Markets Infrastructure Regula-
tion (EMIR) has also made real progress in the OTC
derivatives markets by increasing the use of central
clearing. Article 41 of the EMIR requires central coun-
terparties to impose, call and collect margin. Further-
more, the Regulatory Technical Standards 153/2013
(RTS) provides alternative options linked to procycli-
cality, leverage and margin.130 In particular, both the
RTS and the EMIR are designed to limit the build-up
of leverage in OTC derivatives markets that are subject
to central clearing.
AIFMs also have a leverage framework under the Alter-
native Investment Fund Managers Directive
(AIFMD).131 As part of their risk management process,
AIFMs set a maximum level of leverage that they may
employ on behalf of every alternative investment fund
(AIF) they manage, as well as the extent of the collateral
127. Cullen, above n. 3, at 93-94.
128. Bank for International Settlements, ‘Repo Market Functioning’, CFGS
Paper No. 59 1, at 6 (2017). See also, Cullen, above n. 3, at 93-94;
European Systemic Risk Board, ‘ESRB Opinion to ESMA on Securities
Financing Transactions and Leverage Under Article 29 of the SFTR’, 1,
at 5 (October 2016); P.C. Harding and C.A. Johnson, A Practical Guide
to Using Repo Master Agreements (2017), at 14.
129. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, above n. 6, 1 at 140. See
also, Art. 429 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential require-
ments for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regu-
lation (EU) No 648/2012 (CRR); Art. 87 of Directive 2013/36/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to
the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit
institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and
repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (CRD); pages 16 and
17 of Chapter 1.
130. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013 of 19 December
2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European
Parliament and of the Council with regard to RTS on requirements for
central counterparties, L 52, OJ 23.2.2013, page 41.
131. Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending
Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No
1060/2009 and (EU No 1095/2010) (AIFMD).
reuse right that could be granted under the leveraging
arrangement.132
Reforms in other areas, such as the SFTR and the
UCITS, however, have been less convincing. Under the
SFTR, where repos and securities lending transactions
play a central role, the substantive progress made on
leverage and the use of margin is debatable.133 The same
is true of the guidelines published by the ESMA on
issues related to the UCITS, which specify the require-
ments around efficient portfolio management and risk
management processes in greater detail. In particular,
the use of collateral and the requirements for ‘conserva-
tive’ haircuts.134
Yet the reciprocal of leverage is margin.135 This means
that, in practice, infinite leverage comes up against a sig-
nificant problem – margin. Margin requirements
applied to any given collateralised transaction ensure
that leverage can be limited – this holds true provided
that market participants cannot fund their margin
requirements through unsecured borrowing.136 Markus
Brunnermeier notes that because the collateral giver
must finance margin with its own capital, it is not possi-
ble to borrow the amount equal to the market value of
the collateral.137 For instance, when a financial institu-
tion, such as a hedge fund, enters into a repo transaction
and uses Aaa Dutch government bonds as collateral, it
must negotiate, among other things,138 the amount of
cash that it can ultimately borrow;139 if the posted col-
lateral is worth €100 and the cash received is €80, then
the initial margin/haircut is 120%/20%, the loan to
value ratio is €80/€100 = 80% and the leverage ratio
5:1. These ratios are all synonymous. In other words,
margin requirements determine the maximum amount
that a party can borrow when using a given security as
collateral.140 In light of the fact that leverage lies at the
heart of many past financial crises,141 the authors pro-
pose the adoption of minimum margin regulation to
132. Arts. 15(4) and 25 of the AIFMD.
133. European Securities and Markets Authority, ‘Report on Securities
Financing Transactions and Leverage in the EU’, ESMA/2016/1415, 1,
at 37-39 (2016), www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/
2016-1415_-_report_on_sfts_procyclicality_and_leverage.pdf.
134. Ibid.
135. J. Geanakoplos, ‘The Leverage Cycle’, 1715R Cowles Foundation Dis-
cussion Paper 2010:1, at 1-2.
136. European Systemic Risk Board, ‘The Macroprudential Use of Margins
and Haircuts’, 1, at 25 (2017).
137. M.K. Brunnermeier, ‘Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch
2007-2008’, 23(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives 77, at 91-92
(2009). See also, European Systemic Risk Board, above n. 138.
138. For example, the interest rate.
139. Or any other form of shadow bank, such as an insurance company,
pension fund, investment fund, etc.
140. Constancio, above n. 60.
141. Such as the Wall Street crash of 1927-1929, the Japanese banking crisis
of 1991, the financial derivatives crisis in 1994 that bankrupted Orange
County in California, the 1998 emerging markets mortgage crisis that
collapsed Long-Term Capital Management, the more recent 2008 glob-
al financial crisis. See, M. Schularick and A.M. Taylor, ‘Credit Booms
Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises,
1870–2008’, 102(2) American Economic Review 1029-1061 (2012).
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mitigate the procyclical effects that follow through the
cycle leverage and liquidity spirals.142
Before comprehensive data on SBS is gathered and, on
its basis, liquidity and margin aspects are regulated,
there will always remain a loophole in the financial regu-
lation that slowly, but steadily, undermines the achieve-
ments of TBS-oriented prudential rules.
142. Pacces and Nabilou, above n. 10. See also, Constancio, above n. 60;
European Systemic Risk Board, above n. 138; Bank for International Set-
tlements, above n. 129; Brunnermeier, above n. 138, at 77; Cullen,
above n. 3; J. Geanakoplos and L.H. Pedersen, ‘Monitoring Leverage’,
in M. Brunnermeier and A. Krishnamurthy (eds.), Risk Topography: Sys-
temic Risk and Macro Modeling (2014), at 113; Financial Stability
Board (Press Release), ‘FSB Adjusts Implementation Timelines for Its
Policy Recommendations to Address Financial Stability Risks in Securities
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